



swiss made software

# TUNE INSIGHT




**Federated Encrypted  
Computing:  
Share Insights, protect the data**  
Basel, May 16 2024

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## Regulatory pressure and cyber risks prevent companies to access external data they need & to valorize data they own



### ! Regulatory pressure

- Data privacy
- Data localization

### ! Data dependence


- Need more external data for business decisions
- Increasing pressure to valorize own data

### ! Cyber risks

- Increased attacks
- Risk of data losing its value

Vicious data circle

# “Vanilla” Federated Learning



 Sensitive and Confidential data






 Decrypted Data

 Local Partial Results


- Requires trust on the aggregation server
- Vulnerable to re-identification and reconstruction attacks

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- Z. Wang, M. Song, Z. Zhang, Y. Song, Q. Wang, and H. Qi. Beyond inferring class representatives: User-level privacy leakage from federated learning. In IEEE INFOCOM, 2019.
- L. Zhu, Z. Liu, and S. Han. Deep leakage from gradients. In NIPS, 2019.
- L. Melis, C. Song, E. De Cristofaro, and V. Shmatikov. Exploiting unintended feature leakage in collaborative learning. In IEEE S&P, 2019.
- M. Nasr, R. Shokri, and A. Houmansadr. Comprehensive privacy analysis of deep learning: Passive and active white-box inference attacks against centralized and federated learning. In IEEE S&P, 2019.


# Federated Health Data Space: Technologies

-  **Homomorphic Encryption** → Raw data is never shared, only encrypted data is used for computations.  
encrypted computation
-  **Secure Multiparty Computation** → Decryption of the results can only be run collectively.  
collective key
-  **FL/FA Aggregation** → Only encrypted aggregates are shared.  
of individual data
-  **Differential Privacy** → Minimize re-identification risk  
And disclosure prevention controls
-  **Synthetic Data** → Limited leakage for exploratory workflows  
Unlinkability

- ✓ **Embedded policy enforcement**
- ✓ **Raw data does not move**
- ✓ **Encrypted computation**
- ✓ **Only aggregated data is decrypted**




# This combination of technologies minimizes risks and streamlines compliance



Virtuous insights circle

Organization security perimeter

No need for a trusted 3rd party



## Platform used across verticals

### Hospitals & Pharma

Collective survival analysis in oncology

Lab reference data

Train image classifiers in dermatology

### Insurance & Re-Insurance

Train collective risk models

Cross-vertical collaboration (Value-Based Healthcare)

### Cyber Security

Cross-organization alert enrichment


Collective threat intelligence models

Private search of IoCs/alerts

### Financial Services


Collaborative analytics

Sensitive data pooling, AML-CFT



# Confidential Collaborative Analytics, Machine Learning and AI

# Pharmas, hospitals and insurers can collaborate without transferring or disclosing patient-level data




## Example Healthcare

Relying only on their own data, hospitals and clinics lack representative datasets to provide personalized care

With Tune Insight, they can collaborate with others to recommend precision treatments without moving or disclosing any raw patient data, and include private players in the collaboration

Developed frontend and backend integrations



# Python SDK

## Use case: developer-friendly experience for data analysts and integrations




- Getting Started
- Generic Architecture
- Integrations >
- TI4Health >
- Python SDK

Python SDK

## Python SDK

The Diapason Python SDK is a client library for the Tune Insight API. It allows users or programs to interact with using Python. For example, computation workflows can be created and executed using Jupyter notebooks or other Python programs.



jupyterhub aggregation-statistics Last Checkpoint: 01/02/2023 (read only)

```
File Edit View Insert Cell Kernel Widgets Help Not Trusted Python 3 (ipykernel) Memory: 173.4 MB
```

### Computing the average value of specified columns

In this first example, the client wishes to learn the global average `height`, `weight` and `age` values from the collective dataset. Behind the scenes, at each organization's GeCo backend, the local dataset is fetched and the values for each column are summed up together, then the nodes run an encrypted aggregation protocol to securely (without revealing their individual row count and sums) aggregate their values together as well as their total number of rows. The computation is run both locally (using only the client's organization dataset and collectively)

```
In [8]: aggregation = project.new_aggregation()
fig, axes = plt.subplots(nrows=1, ncols=2)
fig.set_size_inches(15,5)
# First run locally
localResults = aggregation.average(columns=["height", "weight", "age"], local=True)
print('Local Results')
display(localResults)
localResults.plot.bar(title='local averages', alpha=0.6, ax=axes[0])
# Then run it on the collective dataset
results = aggregation.average(columns=["height", "weight", "age"])
print('Collective Results')
display(results)
results.plot.bar(title='collective averages', alpha=0.6, ax=axes[1])
```

Local Results

average height	average weight	average age	
0	178.83	61.99	40.3

Collective Results

average height	average weight	average age	
0	159.53	55.83	47.91



# Example: Cross-jurisdiction Federated Learning for Dermatology



Final aggregated model path

```
In [11]: result_path = m1_result.result_path
         result_path


Out[11]: 's3://t1-bucket0/ef63cc9a-2d62-4f3d-9b7c-5228f3c3be08_m1share_public'

In [12]: history = m1_result.history

In [13]: hybrid_f1_plot(history)
```



## Example: Secure Federated Training of Deep Neural Networks on Dermatology Images



**Dataset:** Fitzpatrick17k, ~30k images  
<https://github.com/mattgroh/fitzpatrick17k>

**Model:**  
 Type: ViT with 4-layers embedding  
 Size: 5,528,259 parameters, 44.3MB

4 epochs	Local training baseline	Secure federated training
<b>Nodes</b>	1 node with 10909 samples	3 nodes (~3635 samples each)
<b>Training accuracy</b>	72.16%	77.65%
<b>Training F1-score</b>	0.279431	0.604438
<b>Validation accuracy</b>	72.13%	78.88%
<b>Validation F1-score</b>	0.279364	0.564171
<b>Privacy params</b>	N/A	$\epsilon = 1.0, \delta = 0.0001$
<b>Time overhead</b>	0	~10% (w.r.t. vanilla FL)

**100 seconds/epoch** on a g4dn.2xlarge AWS EC2 instance with a Nvidia T4 GPU (16GB memory)

***“Technical solutions such as multiparty homomorphic encryption (MHE) that combine these three technical measures while still allowing for the possibility to query and analyse encrypted data without decrypting it have significant potential to **provide effective security measures that facilitate cross-border transfers of personal data in high-risk settings.**”***

Compagnucci et al., Supplementary Measures and Appropriate Safeguards for International Transfers of Personal Data after Schrems II (February 23, 2022). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4042000>

Contact us for a full analysis of the platform benefits and risk minimization, addressing the relevant GDPR recitals.



<p><a href="#">Article 25</a> Data protection by design and by default</p>	<p><a href="#">Article 32</a> Security of processing</p>	<p><a href="#">Article 33</a> Breach notification to supervisory authority</p>
<p><a href="#">Article 34</a> Breach communication to the data subject</p>	<p><a href="#">Article 35</a> Data protection impact assessment</p>	<p><a href="#">Article 46</a> Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards</p>

# Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) for multisite medical data analysis (Example, June 2021)

## Centralized approach with standard pseudonymization

Threat	Threat likelihood	Threat impact	Risk	Risk level
Unlawful access to the system	Unlikely	High	Loss of data confidentiality	Moderate
Malicious use of the system	Possible	High	Loss of data confidentiality	High
Loss of data	Unlikely	Minor	Loss of data integrity, data unavailability	Minor
Data leak of host/cloud	Possible	High	Loss of data confidentiality	High
Collusion of host/cloud	Possible	High	Loss of data confidentiality	High
Corrupted or malicious host/cloud	Possible	High	Data unavailability, loss of data integrity, loss of data confidentiality, loss of data correctness	High
Unavailability of host/cloud	Possible	Minor	Data unavailability, loss of data correctness	Moderate
Re-identification/attribute inference	Possible	High	Loss of data confidentiality	High



## Federated approach enhanced with **TUNE INSIGHT**

Threat	Measure introduced <b>TUNE INSIGHT</b>	Threat likelihood	Threat Impact	Risk	Risk level
Unlawful access to the system	1	Unlikely	Minor	Loss of data confidentiality	Low
Malicious use of the system	1, 2, 4, 10	Possible	Minor	Loss of data confidentiality	Low
Loss of data	3, 5	Unlikely	Minor	Loss of data integrity, data unavailability	Low
Data leak	4, 5, 8, 9, 10	Unlikely	Minor	Loss of data confidentiality	Low
Collusion between nodes	4, 9	Unlikely	Moderate	Loss of data confidentiality	Moderate
Corrupted or malicious nodes	2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Unlikely	Moderate	Data unavailability, loss of data integrity, loss of data confidentiality, loss of data correctness	Moderate
Unavailability of nodes	6, 7	Possible	Minor	Data unavailability, loss of data correctness	Moderate
Re-identification or attribute inference	1, 2, 4, 9, 10	Unlikely	Minor	Loss of data confidentiality	Low

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